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intRoDuctoRy commentS: the cuRRent State 
of climate change law
by Michael B. Gerrard*
The	three	words	that	best	characterize	the	current	state	of	climate	change	law	are	fragmentation,	uncertainty,	and	insufficiency.
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of	climate	finance,	adaptation,	 technology	 transfer,	 reporting,	
























on	 any	 legally	 binding	 obligations	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 similar	
developing	country	commitments.	Although	developing	coun-



























binding	 targets	or	 timetables	 for	 reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	
emissions.	The	Kyoto	Protocol,	negotiated	in	1997,	on	the	other	
implicationS of the copenhagen accoRD foR 
global climate goveRnance
by David Hunter*
* David Hunter is assistant professor and director of the Program on Interna-
tional and Comparative Environmental Law at the American University Wash-
ington College of Law.  He is also the director of AU’s Washington Summer 
Session on Environmental Law.













the bali woRk plan
Recognizing	 that	 the	 first	
reporting	period	under	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	would	end	in	2012,	the	
global	 community	 worked	 for	
several	years	to	set	forth	a	nego-
tiating	plan	that	would	build	on	
the	 Kyoto	 Protocol,	 bring	 the	
United	States	back	into	the	UN	
process	 for	 addressing	 climate	
change,	 and	 outline	 the	 future	
obligations,	 if	 any,	 of	 devel-
oping	 countries.	 These	 efforts	
culminated	 in	 2007	 when	 the	
parties	 to	 the	Framework	Con-
vention	agreed	 to	 the	 so-called	
Bali	Road	Map—a	roadmap	 to	





commitments	 of	 those	 parties	
that	have	adopted	an	emissions	
cap	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	
(called	“Annex	I	Parties”),8	(2)	















ics	 for	 “consideration”	during	 the	negotiations,	 including:	 (i)	
“measurable,	reportable	and	verifiable”	commitments,	including	
quantified	emissions	limitations,	by	all	developed	countries;	and	











provisions	 in	 the	 Bali	 Action	 Plan	 committed	 the	 parties	 to	
negotiate	positive	incentives	for	
reducing	emissions	from	defor-
estation	 and	 forest	 degradation	
(“REDD”)	in	developing	coun-
tries,14	 enhanced	 actions	 for	
adaptation,15	 technology	devel-
opment	and	transfer,16	and	inter-
national	 financial	 support	 for	
responding	to	climate	change.17
The	Bali	Action	Plan	com-
mitted	 both	 the	 United	 States	
and	 developing	 countries	 to	
negotiating	a	post-Kyoto	agree-
ment	 with	 some	 form	 of	 bind-
ing—or	 at	 least	 measurable,	
reportable,	 and	 verifiable—
commitments.	Under	 the	 terms	
of	 the	 Bali	 Action	 Plan,	 the	
agreement	 was	 to	 be	 negoti-
ated	by	the	Fifteenth	CoP	of	the	
UNFCCC	in	December,	2009	in	
Copenhagen.	 The	 Bali	 Action	












its	domestic	 legislative	agenda	with	 the	hopes	 that	economy-
wide	emission	targets	passed	by	the	U.S.	Congress	could	form	
the	basis	for	international	commitments	at	Copenhagen.18	Even	
before	 his	 inauguration,	 Obama	 signaled	 to	 the	 international	
community	his	intention	to	engage	in	meaningful	climate	nego-
tiations	by	publicly	endorsing	federal	cap-and-trade	legislation	
with	 targets	 for	 reducing	current	emissions	 to	1990	 levels	by	
Rather than a detailed, 
binding framework 
for furthering global 
climate cooperation, the 
parties left Copenhagen 
with a general political 
statement that privileges 
the voluntary actions 
of states and devalues 
the role of international 




































































oping	 countries	 were	 unlikely	 to	 make	 any	 significant	 com-




















in	 showing	up	at	Copenhagen?	World	 leaders	 typically	show	
up	 for	 photo	 opportunities	 at	 international	 summits,	 not	 for	
negotiations.
As	 Copenhagen	 approached,	 countries	 began	 to	 position	
themselves	 more	 clearly	 for	 the	 upcoming	 negotiations—but	
the	public	signals	 remained	 largely	mixed.	The	United	States	
announced	they	would	accept	targets	of	17%	reductions	from	
2005	 levels	 by	 2050	 and	 80%	 reductions	 by	 2050.25	 This	























proposal,	 wanting	 to	 pursue	 the	 “two-track”	 approach:	 addi-
tional	binding	commitments	for	developed	countries	under	the	
Kyoto	Protocol	and	nonbinding	actions	 for	developing	coun-


















hard	 line	 and	 offering	 little	 compromise.	 President	 Obama’s	






















ShaReD viSion foR long-teRm coopeRative action
As	part	of	the	Bali	Action	Plan,	the	parties,	including	the	
United	 States	 and	 most	 other	 major	 countries	 in	 the	 world,	
agreed	 to	 launch	 a	 “comprehensive	 process”	 for	 achieving	 a	





Unfortunately,	 the	 Accord	 provides	 little	 specificity	 sur-






















strengthening	 the	 long-term	 goal	 referencing	 various	 matters	




the geneRal fRamewoRk foR mitigation






wide	 emissions	 targets	 for	 2020.”33	 These	 commitments	 are	
expected	to	“further	strengthen	the	emissions	reductions	initi-
ated	by	the	Kyoto	Protocol.”34	Second,	non-Annex	I	countries	










Both	 Annex	 I	 and	 Non-Annex	 I	 countries	 that	 choose	









the	 United	 States,	 on	 passage	 of	
national	 legislation.	 Develop-






emissions	 to	 increase	 but	 less	
than	expected).	Others,	such	as	
India	 and	 China,	 committed	 to	
reducing	 their	 energy	 intensity	
(i.e.	 to	 improving	 their	 emis-
sions	per	unit	output)	but	plac-
ing	no	overall	cap	on	emissions.	
Still	 others,	 like	 the	 Congo	 or	
Brazil,	 listed	 numerous	 sector-
specific	 actions	 or	 goals	 they	
would	 meet.	 Some	 represen-
tative	 examples	 of	 country	
pledges	are	listed	below	on	page	
9-10.



























monitoRing, RepoRting anD veRification
Ever	since	 the	Bali	negotiations	finished	and	 the	world’s	
attention	shifted	to	Copenhagen,	requirements	for	monitoring,	
reporting,	and	verification	 (“MRV”)	 loomed	among	 the	most	
controversial	and	difficult	 issues.	It	was	clear	that	developing	
countries	would	 agree	 to	 a	wide	 range	of	voluntary	 commit-
ments,	 but	 they	 were	 resistant	
to	any	international	oversight—
i.e.	 any	 MRV	 requirements—
attaching	 to	 those	 voluntary	
commitments.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 developing	 countries	






Ensuring	 some	 MRV	 require-





international	 financial	 or	 tech-
nology	assistance.
In	 the	 end,	 developing	


















One	 area	 that	 enjoyed	 perhaps	 the	 greatest	 consensus	 in	
Copenhagen	 was	 the	 framework	 for	 reducing	 emission	 from	
deforestation	 and	 forest	 degradation	 (“REDD”).	 Developing	
countries	 saw	 this	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 generate	 significant	
amounts	of	 foreign	assistance	and	 investment	 to	 improve	 the	
The result was not a 
negotiation over targets 
or actions, but a series of 
unilateral press releases, 
with each country 
announcing what it is 
willing to do to mitigate 
climate change.















































































































of	 financial	 support	 from	 developed	 countries	 was	 critical.49	
Secretary	of	State	Hillary	Clinton	made	a	high-profile	announce-
ment	that	the	industrialized	countries	would	collectively	provide	
$10	billion	 in	annual	support	over	 the	near	 term	(2010-2012)	
and	financial	resources	up	to	$100	billion	per	year	by	2020.50	
These	numbers	would	be	enshrined	in	the	Copenhagen	Accord,	






































the	more	important	reason	for	U.S.	support	 is	 that	 the	United	

































support	 enhanced	 action	 on	 mitigation,	 including	 substantial	
finance	to	reduce	emissions	from	deforestation	and	forest	deg-
radation	(REDD-plus),	adaptation,	technology	development	and	














Indeed,	financing	 is	now	expected	 to	be	a	major	 focus	of	 the	
2010	negotiations	in	Cancun,	Mexico.
ImplIcaTIons For global clImaTe governance
























the thReat to a negotiateD, Science-baSeD 
appRoach






of	 targets	 and	 timetables	 that	 will	 achieve	 the	 science-based	
cap	on	emissions;	(3)	a	global	market-based	system	will	assist	
in	re-allocating	the	cap,	through	such	mechanisms	as	cap-and-
trade	 and	 the	 offset	 market;	 and	 (4)	 compliance	 with	 targets	
and	timetables	will	be	monitored	internationally	and	sanctions	
for	non-compliance	may	be	imposed	by	the	other	parties.	The	



























less	 important	 to	addressing	global	climate	change	 than	what	
happens	in	the	capitals	of	key	countries.	Indeed,	although	the	
Accord	provides	for	significantly	less	monitoring	and	oversight	






national	negotiations	 to	building	capacity	 for	national	 imple-


















the emeRgence of a pluRaliStic appRoach to 
climate goveRnance




was	 ultimately	 negotiated	 outside	 of	 the	 formal	 UNFCCC	





























arguably	 undermines	 progress	 toward	 reaching	 broad	 global	
consensus	for	long-term	cooperative	action.
The	 potential	 for	 splitting	 off	 a	 new	 negotiating	 pro-
cess	under	 the	Accord	raises	 the	specter	of	a	more	pluralistic	
approach	to	climate	governance,	with	significantly	more	insti-




willingness	 to	 negotiate	 the	Accord	outside	of	 the	UNFCCC	






















































policy	 and	 coordinate	 financing.63	 Complicating	 this	 further	








of	 national	 and	 regional	 climate-related	 funds.	 For	 obvious	




















enue.	 During	 the	 Copenhagen	




institutions	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	
the	goals	of	the	UNFCCC	were	
being	 efficiently	 advanced.	
This	 greater	 coordinating	 role	





Much	 of	 the	 debate,	 both	
before	 and	 after	 Copenhagen,	
centered	 around	 whether	 the	
parties	would	continue	the	pur-
suit	 of	 legally	 binding	 targets	
and	timetables.	In	the	end,	the	
choice	 to	 accept	 a	 non-bind-
ing	 option	 reflected	 a	 lack	 of	
political	 consensus—not	 over	







ule	for	negotiating	a	binding	agreement	 in	 the	near	future.	 In	
short,	Copenhagen	can	only	be	viewed	as	a	major	set-back	for	
anyone	seeking	a	hard,	binding	agreement.
To	 some	extent,	 however,	 the	 concerns	over	 the	 relative	
“hardness”	 of	 the	 climate	 regime	 may	 be	 too	 formalistic	 an	
inquiry.	We	should	not	 lose	sight	 that	 the	end	goal	of	global	
climate	policy	is	to	take	action	to	reduce	the	risk	of	significant	
climate	disruption	—	it	is	not	to	have	a	binding	agreement.	In	




monitored	 and	 enforced.	 As	 Jake	 Werksman	 of	 the	 World	
Resources	Institute	notes,	more	important	than	the	formality	is	
the	 functionality	of	binding	 international	 law.65	According	 to	






Looking	 first	 at	 the	 normative	 framework,	 the	 Accord	
offers	 some	 modest	 steps	 forward.	 The	 Accord’s	 “pledge-
and-review”	 system	 means	 that	
both	the	United	States	and	most	
developing	countries	for	the	first	
time	 have	 agreed	 to	 take	 some	
specific	 actions	 for	 mitigating	
climate	change.	As	can	be	 seen	
from	the	few	examples	excerpted	
above,	 many	 (although	 not	 all)	
of	the	commitments	made	under	
the	Accord	 could,	 in	 theory,	 be	
measured	and	verified.	Thus,	for	
example,	 economy-wide	 reduc-
tions,	 improvements	 in	 energy-
intensity,	 or	 sector-specific	
actions	 can	 all	 be	 monitored	
effectively,	 assuming	 the	 coun-
try	 has	 established	 appropriate	
baselines,	developed	methodolo-
gies	 for	 measuring	 results,	 and	
committed	the	resources	to	moni-
toring	 over	 time.	 Developing	
countries	also	agreed	for	the	first	






















[B]oth the process and 
outcome of Copenhagen 
do not offer significant 
reason to hope that the 
world’s leaders can put 
aside short-term political 
expedience to make 
the long-term, shared, 
equitable steps needed to 
avert substantial climate 
disruption.
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oversight—resulted	 in	 a	 two-tiered	 outcome.	 For	 developing	
countries	 that	 take	 steps	without	 international	 support,	MRV	













sidered	 the	 relative	 lack	of	MRV	requirements	 to	be	a	major	
victory	that	preserved	their	national	sovereignty.
Even	 more	 disappointing	 for	 those	 who	 want	 muscular	
international	 oversight	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 sanctions	 for	 non-
compliance	in	the	Accord.	This	is	a	difficult	area	generally	in	




































3	 For	more	on	the	UNFCCC,	see	Daniel	Bodansky,	The U.N. Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18	yale J. int’l l.	451	(1993).
4	 UN’s Kyoto Treaty Against Global Warming Comes Into Force,	un newS 
SeRv.,	Feb.	16,	2005,	http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=1335
9&Cr=global&Cr1=warm;	Bush Firm over Kyoto Stance,	cnn.com,	Mar.	29,	
2001,	http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/29/schroeder.bush/index.html.
5	 Kyoto	Protocol,	supra note	2,	art.	3,	¶	1.	See generally michael gRubb et 









of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol,	¶	22,	U.N.	Doc.	FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5	(Feb.	5,	
2008).
9	 Conference	of	the	Parties	Serving	as	the	Meeting	of	the	Parties	to	the	Kyoto	
Protocol,	Bali,	Indon.,	Dec.	3-15,	2007,	Report of the Conference of the Par-
ties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Third 
Session—Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties 























require	 transparent	 accountability	 for	national	mitigation	action	









































StanDaRDization of ReDD monitoRing 
technology to level the playing fielD
by Beth Zgoda*
* Beth Zgoda is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University Washing-










































to	Level	the	Playing	Field	continued on page 57
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exceptionaliSm uniteD?: unpacking unfccc 
aRticle 7.2(c)
by Niranjali M. Amerasinghe and Kristen Hite*
* Niranjali M. Amerasinghe is an attorney at the Center for International Envi-
ronmental Law.  Ms. Amerasinghe holds an LL.M. in International and Com-
parative Law from the George Washington University Law School, and an LL.B. 
from the University of Bristol.  Kristen Hite is an attorney at the Center for 
International Environmental Law and an adjunct professor of international 
environmental law at the Paul H. Nitze Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies.  She holds an M.S. in gestión ambiental/Environmental 
Management from the Universidad San Francisco de Quito in Ecuador and a 
J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.  The authors would like to thank 
Matthew Axtell, Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Gordon M. Scott, and Stephen J. Porter 
for their insightful comments and review.
InTroducTIon
In	the	wee	hours	of	the	United	Nations	Framework	Conven-tion	on	Climate	Change’s	(“UNFCCC”	or	“Convention”)	fifteenth	Conference	of	the	Parties	(“COP-15”),	the	United	




cific	 context	 of	 the	 negotiations	 at	 Copenhagen?	 Some	 have	
suggested	that	this	particular	provision	could	present	a	unique	
opportunity	for	specific	groups	of	countries	to	take	coordinated	





The	Conference	of	 the	Parties,	 as	 the	 supreme	body	
of	 this	 Convention,	 shall	 keep	 under	 regular	 review	
the	implementation	of	the	Convention	and	any	related	
legal	 instruments	 that	 the	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	
may	 adopt,	 and	 shall	 make,	 within	 its	 mandate,	 the	
decisions	 necessary	 to	 promote	 the	 effective	 imple-
















ties	of	 the	Parties	 and	 their	 respective	commitments	
under	this	Protocol.4
Indeed,	the	difference	between	the	Convention	text	and	this	

















































tial	guidance	on	what	 it	would	mean	 for	 the	UNFCCC	if	 the	
COP	were	to	facilitate	coordination	of	measures	adopted	by	two	
or	more	Parties.	As	such,	we	have	limited	the	examination	of	














ative	 phrase	 of	 Convention	
Article	7.2(c)	is	“facilitate	coor-
dination	of	measures	adopted,”	
we	 now	 examine	 the	 ordinary	





ance	 on	 definitions	 we	 begin	
our	analysis	with	 standard	dic-





goal.26	And	“adopt”	 implies	 some	 type	of	 formal	 acceptance	
process.27










In	 this	 section	 we	 examine	 specific	 contextual	 consider-
ations	associated	with	each	of	the	key	terms.	Under	the	Vienna	
Convention,	 “context”	 in	 relevant	 part	 includes,	 inter alia,	
other	provisions	of	the	treaty;28	and	“any	subsequent	agreement	









taken	 by	 all	 Parties;31	 and	 the	
transfer	 of	 technologies	 and	
capacity	building	for	developing	
countries	 by	 developed	 coun-
try	 Parties,	 including	 those	 in	






tation	 of	 measures	 to	 address	
climate	 change	 and	 its	 effects;	
however	 there	 are	 no	 express	
provisions	 that	 link	“facilitate”	
with	 mitigation	 or	 new	 and	
additional	financing	measures.33	
Additionally,	 facilitation	 can	
apply	 to:	 “(i)	 the	 development	





















Based on this Vienna 
Convention guidance, the 
relevant terms of Article 
7.2(c) should be analyzed 
in accordance with their 
ordinary meaning in 
context and in light of the 
object and purpose of the 
UNFCCC.
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In	the	context	of	the	scope	of	activities	that	may	be	facili-
tated,	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	offers	several	 textual	references	for	
consideration.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	 specifically	allows	 for	 the	







While	 the	 Protocol	 and	




the	 Vienna	 Convention	 frame-
work,	 as	 a	 subsequent	 agree-
ment	applying	provisions	of	the	




mandates	 the	 CMP	 to	 facili-
tate	cooperation	with	respect	to	
Annex	I	(“AI”)	Parties’	obliga-
tions.45	 An	 additional	 consid-
eration	 is	 that	 the	Protocol	has	
provisions	 that	explicitly	allow	
for	 facilitation	 at	 the	 national	
and	international	levels,	while	the	Convention	also	allows	for	
facilitation	at	the	sub-regional	and	regional	levels.46
In	 sum,	 facilitate	 seems	 to	 mean	 enhancing	 something	


















ties,	and	coordination	relates	 to	a	subset	of	Parties,51	 the	 two	
separate	COP	powers	point	 to	 the	inference	that	“coordinate”	
and	 “exchange	 of	 information”	 are	 distinct.	 However,	 to	 the	













across	 the	 UNFCCC	 and	 KP,	
and	establishing	expert	teams.53	




In	 the	 context	 of	 seeking	
“harmonious	 action,”	 as	 the	
plain	language	indicates,	“coor-
dination”	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
UNFCCC	 and	 KP	 can	 include	
the	 development	 of	 ways	 and	








The	 UNFCCC	 provides	 some	 interesting	 context	 for	 the	
meaning	 and	 use	 of	 measures.	 At	 a	 general	 level,	 there	 are	
references	to	“measures”	with	respect	 to:	“addressing	climate	
change;”56	taking	action	to	“combat	climate	change;”57	taking	
















national	or	 regional	programs.63	 In	 implementing	 these	mea-
sures,	certain	considerations,	including	“social,	economic,	and	
Measures taken to protect 
the climate system should 
be tailored to “the 
specific conditions of each 
Party” and be “integrated 






measures	 in	 their	 national	 communications.65	 In	 the	 specific	
context	of	AI	mitigation,	measures	 (in	 tandem	with	policies)	
are	required	on	both	national	and	regional	levels.66	AI	Parties	
can	 jointly	 implement	 these	measures.67	Detailed	 information	
on	 these	 policies	 and	 measures	 must	 be	 included	 in	 national	
communications	in	accordance	with	relevant	articles.68	On	miti-
gation	generally,	the	COP	can	promote	and	guide	comparable	
methodologies	 to	 evaluate	 the	 “effectiveness	 of	 measures	 to	
limit	the	emissions	and	enhance	the	removals	of	these	gases.”69
Measures	can	also	apply	to	obligations	of	developed	coun-
try	Parties	and	other	Parties	 in	Annex	 II	 for	 the	provision	of	
financial	 resources	 and	 technology	 transfer.70	Although	mea-
sures	are	not	explicitly	referenced	in	respect	of	providing	finan-
cial	resources	for	developing	country	mitigation,	adaptation,	and	
technology	 transfer	 to	developing	countries	when	 setting	out	
Party	obligations,	Article	12.3	on	inclusion	of	details	in	national	
communications	specifically	refers	to	such	activities	as	“mea-







































monious	 action	 to	 address	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 actions,	






















































to	 those	 on	 which	 formal	 action	 has	 been	 taken	 by	 Parties,	
whether	specifically	legislative	in	nature	or	otherwise.
bRoaDeR contextual conSiDeRationS
In	 this	 section,	 we	 briefly	 examine	 contextual	 consider-
ations	relevant	to	the	power	as	a	whole.
In	international	law,	“Parties”	typically	means	those	States	










the	 KP’s	 governing	 body	 (the	 CMP)	 is	 legally	 distinct	 from	
the	UNFCCC’s	COP,	the	Protocol	does	include	provisions	that	
apply	to	the	UNFCCC’s	AI	Parties.108	For	KP	Article	13.4(d),	

















instruments	 that	 the	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 may	
adopt,	 and	 shall	make,	within	 its	mandate,	 the	deci-
sions	necessary	to	promote	the	effective	implementa-
tion	of	the	Convention.110
This	demonstrates	 that	 the	primary	role	of	 the	COP	is	 to	
promote	 effective	 implementation	of	 the	UNFCCC,	 thus	 any	
exercise	of	powers	must	contribute	to	achieving	this	goal.	Fur-
ther,	the	chapeau	provides	guidance	on	the	form	of	action	that	
the	COP	can	 take	within	 its	powers;	 the	COP	shall	make	 the	
decisions	necessary	to	implement	the	UNFCCC.
obJect anD puRpoSe

















ments	 (“MEAs”),	 which	 could	 be	 helpful	 in	 determining	 the	



















which	 means	 that	 most	 procedural	 and	 substantive	 issues—
unless	specified	 in	 treaty	 text	or	outside	of	 rule	42—must	be	




























Considering	 all	 of	 these	 procedural	 matters,	 perhaps	 the	
most	likely	way	that	the	COP	would	consider	a	request	to	facil-
itate	the	coordination	of	measures	would	be	through	a	formal	











Following	 the	 Vienna	 Convention’s	 direction	 on	 treaty	
interpretation	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 ordinary	 meaning,	 context,	







generally	 support	 the	plain	meaning	of	 the	 terms,	which	col-






























context	 of	 Article	 7.2(c)?	 	 To	 answer	 this	 question	 we	 must	
define	“measures	adopted	by	them.”		The	ordinary	meaning	of	



















Putting	 these	 terms	 together,	 “facilitate	 coordination	 of	









sustainable	development	 and	 takes	 into	 account	 common	but	
differentiated	responsibilities.	










of	countries	 to	act,	due	 to	 the	provisional	 rules	of	procedure,	
in	practice	 the	COP	may	find	it	difficult	 to	fulfill	 its	mandate	
given	that	any	decision	taken	would	need	to	be	by	consensus.	
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Nevertheless,	real	possibilities	exist	for	enhanced	coordination	
































































Article	7.2(c)	continued on page 58
23	 See UNFCCC,	supra note	1,	art.	1.
24	 webSteR’S new woRlD college DictionaRy	508	(4th	ed.	2001).
25	 Id. at 320.
26	 Id. at 892.

























42	 Id. art.	13.4(c)	(addressing	“facilitate”	in	the	context	of	CMP	functions);	see 
also id.	13.4(d)).
43	 See id. art.	10(c),	(e).
44	 See	id. art.	10(c).





46	 Compare UNFCCC,	supra note	1,	art.	6(a),	with KP,	supra	note	4,	art.	10(e).

























































fSm vS. czech: a new “StanDing” foR 
climate change?
by Paulo A. Lopes
* Paulo A. Lopes is a J.D./M.P.P. Candidate, 2011, at American University 






































Change?	continued on page 59
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aSSeSSing offSet Quality in the clean 
Development mechaniSm
by The Offset Quality Initiative*
* The Offset Quality Initiative consists of the following member organizations: 
The Climate Trust, founded to manage a portfolio of compliance-grade carbon 
projects as a result of Oregon’s leadership in passing the nation’s first legisla-
tion to limit carbon dioxide emissions, spearheads and leads the Offset Quality 
Initiative; The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, established in 1998 as 
a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and independent organization dedicated to providing 
credible information, straight answers, and innovative solutions in the effort to 
address global climate change; The Climate Action Reserve, a private nonprofit 
organization addressing climate change and bringing together participants from 
the government, environment and business sectors, directs the California Cli-
mate Action Registry, Climate Action Reserve and Center for Climate Action; 
The Environmental Resource Trust, co-founder of the American Carbon Reg-
istry, which in 2008 was the most widely used voluntary carbon market regis-
try in the world; Greenhouse Gas Management Institute, a registered nonprofit 
organization, trains, certifies, and networks a global community of experts that 
account, audit and manage GHG emissions based on world-class training and 
professional standards; and The Climate Group, an independent nonprofit orga-
nization that works with government and business leaders to accelerate the 
transition to a low-carbon economy, founded in 2004 with offices in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, China, India, and Australia.
InTroducTIon

















titled	Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Green-
house Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy.2 
OQI	considers	the	CDM	process	for	addressing	each	criterion,	



































To	 ensure	 that	 offsets	 are	 additional,	 the	 CDM	 requires	



































indicator	 to	 compare	 the	 proj-
ect’s	performance	to	alternative	




indicates	 that	 there	 is	 a	 more	
financially	attractive	option	than	
undertaking	 the	 CDM	 project,	
the	 project	 passes	 this	 test.	 A	
Sensitivity	Test	is	also	required	




and/or	 regional	 penetration	 of	
the	 proposed	 CDM	 activity	
(i.e.,	technology	or	practice).	If	
activities	 similar	 to	 the	 CDM	















the CDM Fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Develop-
ment Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for 
Improvement.10 The	media,	academic	literature,	and	trade	press	
cited Schneider’s	paper	widely	for	its	assertion	that	up	to	twenty	






Wara	and	David	Victor	titled	A Realistic Policy on International 
Carbon Offsets	is	another	notable	critique	of	the	CDM’s	abil-
ity	 to	 ensure	project	 additionality.13	Wara	and	Victor	 largely	
focused	their	criticism	on	the	applications	for	CERs	made	by	
nearly	all	new	Chinese	renewable	energy	capacity	at	the	time,	
despite	 the	 Chinese	 government’s	 national	 policy	 goals	 that	
focused	on	 increasing	 investment	 in	 renewable	energy.14	The	
implication	of	 their	argument	was	
that	it	would	have	been	impos-
sible	 for	 all	 these	 projects	 to	
meet	 the	 CDM’s	 additional-
ity	 test,	 since	 at	 least	 some	 of	
the	 renewable	 energy	 capac-
ity	 brought	 online	 at	 the	 time	
must	 have	 been	 attributable	 to	
China’s	 energy	 policy,	 not	 the	
CDM.15	 They	 claimed	 that	 if	
the	 CDM’s	 additionality	 tests	
could	not	sift	out	the	additional	
from	non-additional	projects	 in	
this	 example,	 then	 they	 could	
not	 sufficiently	 ensure	 offset	
quality.16
Wara	and	Victor	also	criti-
cized	 the	 concept	 of	 offsets	
in	 general	 by	 asserting	 that	
increasingly	 burdensome	 tests	
would	 be	 required	 to	 suffi-
ciently	ensure	additionality	to	an	


















Overall, OQI finds that 
the CDM’s processes 
perform sufficiently 
against most of our core 
offset quality criteria, and 
with further refinement 
should be capable of 
performing sufficiently 
against all criteria.
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nor	 irreparable.	 Improvements	 in	 the	 past	 few	 years	 include	
the	 introduction	of	both	 the	Registration	and	Issuance	Teams	
(“RITs”)	and	additional	secretariat	staff	 that	provide	multiple	




nificantly	 over	 the	past	 two	years.19	As	 the	Executive	Board	



















the	 establishment	 of	 performance	 benchmarks	 for	 both	 addi-





























additionality	 involves	 demonstrating	 that	 a	 project	 activity	
would	not	have	occurred	in	the	absence	of	the	CDM,	baselines	
establish	 the	 plausible	 GHG	 emissions	 scenario	 without	 the	
project.
CDM	Process	for	Establishing	Baselines








































a	 hybrid	 approach	 that	 combines	 both	 project-specific	 and	
standardized	 evaluations.	 For	 example,	 the	 Executive	 Board	
approved	a	methodology	in	2008	for	the	manufacture	of	energy-
efficient	 refrigerators,	 which	 takes	 a	 benchmarked	 approach	
to	 establishing	 project	 baselines.	 As	 opposed	 to	 other	 meth-



























Similar	 to	 additionality,	 standardized	 baselines	 are	 not	









for	certain	project	 types,	 they	may	be	 inappropriate	 for	 those	
with	substantial	project-specific	considerations.









The	 CDM	 requires	 that	 an	 approved	 monitoring	 plan	
for	 each	project	 be	 included	 in	 its	Project	Design	Document	
(“PDD”).23	CDM	methodologies	lay	out	detailed	rules	and	guid-





















Recommendation(s):	 The	 CDM	 has	 a	 strong	 exist-







and	 auditors	 greater	 clarity	 on	 the	 requirements	 for	 project	
implementation.
offSet cRiteRia #4: offSetS ShoulD be 
inDepenDently valiDateD & veRifieD
An	 independent	and	qualified	 third	party,	 free	 from	con-


















































well	 as	 SGS’	 recent	 suspension,	 indicate	 that	 procedures	 for	
spot-checks	 and	 periodic	 evaluation	 as	 well	 as	 oversight	 of	
DOEs	by	 the	Executive	Board	 is	 improving.	However,	more	




of	 the	 Validation	 and	 Verification	 Manual	 (“VVM”)	 by	 the	
CDM	Executive	Board	in	2008.29




























offSet cRiteRia #5: offSetS ShoulD be 
unambiguouSly owneD
Offsets	should	have	a	single	owner	with	clear	rights	to	the	





Before	any	offset	project	 activity	can	move	 forward,	 the	
Designated	National	Authority	(“DNA”)31	of	the	host	country	
must	approve	 the	project	on	behalf	of	 that	nation’s	sovereign	




bers	 and	 a	UN	 registry	 that	meets	 international	 best	 practice	
standards	 for	 accounting	 and	 transactions,	 like	 those	 used	 in	
financial	 banking	 systems.	 The	 registry	 uses	 unique	 account	


















of	CER	ownership	creates	 a	 robust	mechanism	 for	 establish-
ing	unambiguous	credit	ownership	and	for	prevention	of	dou-





offSet cRiteRia #6: offSetS ShoulD aDDReSS 
leakage


















to	 fossil	 fuels.	The	CDM	methodology	(“AM-0036”)	 for	 this	
kind	of	project	requires	project	participants	to	demonstrate	that	
wood	waste	is	abundant.	If	such	a	demonstration	is	not	possible,	




















































Recommendation(s):	 OQI	 recommends	 investigating	























to	 provide	 health	 and	 environmental	 co-benefits	 whenever	
possible.
CDM	Process	for	Ensuring	No	Net	Harm
To	 ensure	 that	 offset	 projects	 do	 no	 net	 harm,	 the	 CDM	
requires	project	participants	to	sponsor	a	stakeholder	consultation	
process	during	the	project	design	phase.	During	the	consultation	





materials	 available	 in	 the	 language	 of	 local	 constituents.	 The	
PDD	 must	 include	 a	 summary	 of	 any	 stakeholder	 comments	









for	causing	 local	 environmental	or	 social	harm.	For	example,	
a	 number	 of	 environmental	 non-governmental	 organizations	















The	 actual	 impact	 of	 CDM	 projects	 on	 sustainable	
development	 is	difficult	 to	 assess	because	 it	 depends	
on	the	definition	of	sustainable	development	which	is	
defined	by	most	countries	in	very	broad	terms.	Many	
countries	 have	 established	 and	 published	 criteria	 to	
assess	 whether	 a	 project	 contributes	 to	 sustainable	
development.	 However,	 they	 are	 often	 very	 general	
.	.	.	[F]ew	[projects]	comply	with	criteria	that	are	related	






















definitions	 of	 sustainable	 development	 differ	 significantly	
between	countries,	and	are	often	broad,	vague,	or	multifarious.
Recommendation(s):	The	CDM	Executive	Board	should	
continue	 to	 work	 towards	 ensuring	 that	 offset	 projects	 do	 no	
net	harm.	Programs	 to	 engage	and	educate	 local	 stakeholders	




























Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse 

































Before	 the	 project	 can	 be	 officially	 “registered”	 by	 the	
Executive	 Board	 (“EB”),	 an	 independent	 third	 party	 auditor,	
called	a	Designated	Operational	Entity	(“DOE”),42	must	review	
the	project	activity	and	documentation	against	the	requirements	























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2	 offSet Quality initiative, enSuRing offSet Quality: integRating high 
Quality gReenhouSe gaS offSetS into noRth ameRican cap-anD-tRaDe 




ment	Mechanism–Executive	Board,	Methodological Tool: Tool for the Dem-





7	 See inStitute foR global enviRonmental StRategieS, cDm in chaRtS	84,	
V.7.0	78	(2009),	http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/970/
attach/charts7.0.pdf	(last	visited	Mar.	1,	2010).
8	 See	Methodological Tool,	supra note	4, at	10.
9	 Id. at	11.
10	 lambeRt SchneiDeR, iS the cDm fulfilling itS enviRonmental anD SuS-
tainable Development obJectiveS? an evaluation of the cDm anD optionS 




13	 Michael	W.	Wara	&	David	G.	Victor,	A Realistic Policy on International 
Carbon Offsets, (Program	on	Energy	and	Sustainable	Development	at	Stanford	





17	 See id. at	16-17.
18	 Id. at	17.
19	 See lambeRt SchneiDeR & lennaRt mohR, a Rating of DeSignateD opeRa-
tional entitieS accReDiteD unDeR the clean Development mechaniSm: Scope, 
methoDology, anD ReSultS	14	(Öko-Institut	2009),	available at	http://assets.
panda.org/downloads/wwf_doe_rating___scope_methodology_and_results_
final.pdf.
20	 See	Ram m. ShReStha et al., uniteD nationS enviRonment pRogRamme, 





ment	Mechanism–Executive	Board,	Approved Baseline and Monitoring Meth-
odology AM0070: Manufacturing of Energy Efficient Domestic Refrigerators 3, 









Development	Mechanism–Executive	Board,	Procedure For Accrediting Opera-
tional Entities by the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism	





























Kyoto	Protocol,	Montreal,	Can.,	Nov.	28–Dec.10,	2005,	Appendix D: Clean 




Development	Mechanism–Executive	Board,	Approved Baseline and Monitor-









38	 See SchneiDeR, supra note	10,	at	46.
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climate change anD the Regional human 
RightS SyStemS
by Megan S. Chapman*
* Megan S. Chapman is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University 



























































































American	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 the	 petition	 could	 only	 be	
brought	before	the	IACHR,	which	may	issue	recommendations	





















































legal	 relationship,	 a	 relationship	of	 responsibility—of	
the	states	for	violations	of	the	rights	that	you	have	very	
clearly	described.33
This	 causal	 connection	 question	 presents	 the	 greatest	 gap	
between	precedent	cases	on	environmental	damage	that	have	been	

























1	 Anne	Parsons,	Human Rights and Climate Change: Shifting the Burden to 















Rights	Systems	continued on page 60
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inDuStRy cRieS foul to epa’S attempt to 
Regulate ghg emiSSionS uSing the clean  
aiR act
by William J. Walsh, Mark A. Erman, & Jane C. Luxton*
*Pepper Hamilton LLP. The authors assisted several clients (including trade 
associations) in preparing their comments on the Environmental Protection 
Agency Prevention of Significant Deterioration Tailoring Rule discussed in this 
article.
InTroducTIon
The	U.S.	House	of	Representatives	passed	a	comprehen-sive,	 albeit	 flawed,	 climate	 change	 bill,	 the	 Waxman/Markey	 bill,	 in	 June	 2009,1	 and	 the	 Senate	 Environ-
ment	Committee	voted	to	bring	a	similar,	but	measurably	more	
demanding,	bill,	the	Kerry/Boxer	bill,	to	the	floor	of	the	Senate.2	













increase	 the	price	of	 allowances	 and	 the	 cost	 of	 the	program,	
according	to	the	EPA;	(d)	reduces	the	total	amount	of	free	allow-
ances,	primarily	to	reduce	the	national	deficit,	and	(e)	provides	

















bacKground and summary oF The proposed 
psd TaIlorIng rule




























































commenTs on The proposed psd  
TaIlorIng rule
The	 Proposed	 PSD	 Tailoring	 Rule	 has	 the	 potential	 to	
adversely	 affect	 millions	 of	 plants	 from	 an	 extremely	 diverse	








congReSS DiD not intenD to Regulate ghg 














Regulation of ghg emiSSionS puRSuant to the 
caa iS not ReQuiReD by the SupReme couRt
Most	industry	comments	argued	persuasively	that	regulation	
of	GHG	emissions	pursuant	to	the	CAA	is	not	required	by	Mas-




might	 include.	 In	essence,	 some	argue	 that	GHG	is	a	political	
issue	of	global	impact	that	should	be	decided	by	Congress.	Con-
gress,	however,	could	decide	to	take	no	action.
inDuStRy Split conceRning whetheR the abSuRD 
ReSultS anD aDminiStRative neceSSity DoctRineS 
applieD







Congress	 to	 intervene	by	amending	the	CAA	to	bar	or	at	 least	
delay	use	of	the	CAA	to	regulate	GHG	emissions,	and	proposed	









inDuStRy oppoSeD acting befoRe a moRe ReaSoneD 




























mental	groups	have	filed	administrative	or	 legal	 challenges	 in	
more	than	166	existing	coal-fired	electric	plant	permit	proceed-
ings,	 with	 113	 claimed	 “victories”	 (which	 includes	 remands,	
delays,	and	other	non-final	determinations).25	In	fact,	the	Sierra	
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Club	settled	one	lawsuit	in	exchange	for	the	utility	“voluntarily”	




implementation	 of	 the	 CAA	 for	 delaying	 implementation	 of	
aspects	 of	 the	 PSD	 program	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 administrative	










one Size DoeS not fit all emitteRS




























higheR thReSholDS ShoulD apply
Many	industries28	argued	for	higher	thresholds	than	25,000	
















ters”	 by	 almost	 two-thirds	 but	 would	 only	 decrease	 the	 GHG	
emissions	subject	 to	 regulation	by	 four	percent.	This	marginal	
incremental	benefit	is	not	consistent	with	the	intent	of	the	PSD	





































the tailoRing Rule ShoulD not apply to plantS 
that might ReSult in caRbon leakage
Several	industries	and	industry	coalitions	noted	that	so	called	
carbon	leakage	is	almost	certain	to	increase	the	net	global	GHG	




















theRe aRe no bactS
None	of	the	traditional	air	pollution	controls	are	designed	
to	control	CO2	since	it	has	not	yet	been	regulated.	Industry	com-













the Rule ShoulD pRoviDe incentiveS to inDuStRieS 
that pRoDuce pRoDuctS that ReDuce ghg 













nations	 and	 regions,	 and	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	
nations.	 The	 inherent	 complexity	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	













































GHG	Emissions	Using	the	Clean	Air	Act	continued on page 61
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On	January	27,	2010,	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Com-mission	(“SEC”)	provided	public	companies	with	inter-pretive	guidance	 for	 climate	 change	 related	disclosure	
requirements.1	In	light	of	recent	legislation	and	investor	demand,2	
the	SEC	acted	prudently	because	 the	 interpretive	guidance	will	










































Sec inteRpRetive guiDance foR climate-
RelateD DiScloSuReS
By Nickolas M. Boecher*
*Nickolas M. Boecher is a J.D. Candidate, May 2012, at American University 
Washington College of Law.
Commentators	have	suggested	that	legal	problems	could	arise	









































Disclosures	continued on page 62
44winter 2010
ReaDily Deployable appRoacheS to 
geoengineeRing: cool mateRialS anD 
aggReSSive RefoReStation
by Max G. Bronstein*
* Max G. Bronstein is a graduate student at the University of Michigan pursuing 
a masters in Public Policy, a certificate in science and technology policy, and is 
a graduate student instructor for a course in National Science Policy.  He previ-
ously served as a policy analyst and advisor to the Directors of the U.S. National 
Science Foundation.  He has also completed a Congressional internship with the 
House Committee on Science and Technology.  In the fall of 2010, he plans to 
pursue a PhD in science and technology policy.
InTroducTIon
Humans	 have	 been	 disrupting	 the	 Earth’s	 climate	 for	hundreds	of	 thousands	of	years.1	Burning	a	piece	of	wood	for	warmth,	cutting	down	a	tree	to	build	shelter,	
or	even	planting	a	crop	are	all	ways	that	humans	have	interacted	
with	and	fundamentally	altered	the	climate	and	the	environment.	
New	 research	has	 indicated	 that	breakthroughs	 in	agriculture	
as	long	as	8,000	years	ago	have	played	a	major	role	in	green-
house	gas	emissions	and	may	have	even	reversed	a	trend	toward	






























rate	 of	 deforestation—can	 have	 a	 marked	 impact	 on	 carbon	
emissions.	
Most	 people	 believe	 erroneously	 that	 humans	 did	 not	
begin	to	significantly	alter	the	climate	until	the	second	half	of	
the	19th	century,	which	marked	the	start	of	the	second	Indus-
trial	 Revolution.13	 Rather,	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 acted	 as	
a	carbon	multiplier	by	automating	and	scaling	up	the	carbon-










mate	and	 fundamentally	 remaking	 the	environment	at	a	 local	
and	 planetary	 scale.16	 The	 behaviors	 driving	 such	 changes,	

































sun’s	 energy,	 including	 proposals	 ranging	 from	 space-based	
mirrors	 to	cloud	whitening	and	
cloud	 seeding	 using	 aerosol	
particles.21	 The	 goal	 of	 these	
approaches	 is	 to	 control	 the	
amount	of	solar	energy	striking	
the	 Earth	 by	 deflecting	 more	
of	 this	 energy	 into	 space.22	 If	
ultimately	 successful,	 the	 cli-
mate	 will	 cool	 because	 energy	
is	 being	 reflected	 rather	 than	
absorbed	 by	 the	 Earth	 and	 the	
atmosphere.23	 While	 these	 are	
intriguing	 approaches,	 some	
are	exorbitantly	expensive	(e.g.	






and	 practicable	 methods	 for	






cool maTerIals cool The World
The	U.S.	Secretary	of	Energy,	Nobel	Laureate	Dr.	Steven	
Chu,	has	frequently	avowed	the	virtues	of	white	roofs.25	The	























effect	 alone	 accounts	 for	 5-10	 percent	 of	 the	 peak	 electric-
ity	demand	for	cooling	buildings	in	cities.32	Hence,	mitigating	
the	 heat	 island	 effect	 through	
simple	 interventions	 like	white	
roofs	can	be	an	effective	way	of	
reducing	 energy	 demand,	 cut-
ting	CO2	emissions,	and	increas-
ing	global	albedo.	
In	 addition	 to	 roofs,	 roads	
are	another	component	of	urban	
infrastructure	 that	 can	 play	 a	
significant	role	in	global	reflec-
tivity	and	mitigation	of	the	heat	
island	 effect.	 Cool	 pavements,	
as	 they	 are	 commonly	 called,	
work	 on	 the	 same	 principle	 as	





that	 a	 cool	 pavements	 initia-
tive	could	offset	as	much	as	38	
kg	 CO2	 per	 square	 meter.
34	 If	








there	 are	 low	 barriers	 to	 implementation,	 as	 they	 are	 largely	














emissions.	While	 this	 is	 an	 important	 approach	 to	mitigating	
climate	change,	increasing	the	global	albedo	is	only	part	of	the	
Meanwhile, as our 
understanding of the 
impacts of climate change 
has sharpened, it is 
increasingly evident that 
failure to limit emissions 
will result in massive and 
irreparable damage to  






















limiting	 deforestation	 and	 degradation.	 Calculations	 done	 by	
Canadell	et	al.	have	shown	that,	if	all	deforested	land	was	con-
verted	back	to	forests,	the	seques-





















































reforestation	 and	 albedo	 manage-
ment	are	two	simple,	relatively	
inexpensive,	 and	 effective	
methods	 for	 mitigating	 cli-
mate	change.	Reforestation	not	
only	increases	albedo	in	certain	
regions,	 but	 more	 widespread	
and	healthy	forests	act	as	a	natu-
ral	 carbon	 sink,	 provide	 innu-
merable	 ecosystem	 services,	
and	create	new	habitation	space	




tive	 mechanism	 for	 deflecting	
the	sun’s	energy	and	decreasing	
the	heat	island	effect,	which	can	
ultimately	 lower	 energy	 usage	







Mitigation	 within	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	
(“EPA”)	by	executive	order.	Establishing	this	office	via	execu-
tive	order	would	bypass	Congress,	because	this	program	needs	
to	be	 implemented	 as	 soon	 as	 possible	 in	 order	 to	maximize	
impact	and	effectiveness.	The	office	would	be	responsible	for	
drafting,	implementing,	and	enforcing	best	practices	for	devel-
opers	 and	civil	 engineers	 to	mitigate	 climate	 change	 through	
Estimates have also 
shown that a “cool roofs” 
initiative could offset 
about 24 billion gigatons 
of CO2—the equivalent 
of total annual global 
CO2 emissions—over the 
course of the roofs’ lives.
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While	 these	 initiatives	 may	 appear	 overly	 ambitious	 or	
unlikely,	they	present	a	more	pragmatic	approach	to	addressing	
one	of	the	most	profound	and	complex	challenges	of	our	time.	

















4	 K.L.	Denman,	et	al.,	Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System 
















u.S. climate change policy v. inteRnational 
tRaDe RuleS: complying with gatt
by Tina R. Goel*
* Tina R. Goel is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University Washing-
ton College of Law.
The	Copenhagen	negotiations	did	not	result	in	the	global	environmental	 treaty	 desired	 by	 many,	 but,	 instead,	 in	plans	 to	 reduce	greenhouse	gas	 (“GHG”)	 emissions	or	
carbon	intensity	from	fifty-five	nations,	including	China,	India,	




































The	 importer	allowance	 requirement	 in	ACES	 is	 likely	 to	
violate	GATT	Articles	I	and	III	because	it	treats	“like”	products	
dissimilarly.	IRAP	requires	importers	to	submit	IRAs	based	upon	













































Rules:	Complying	with	GATT	continued on page 64
49 SuStainable Development law & policy
eQuitable but ineffective: how the 
pRinciple of common but DiffeRentiateD 
ReSponSibilitieS hobbleS the global fight 
againSt climate change
by Mary J. Bortscheller*
* Mary J. Bortscheller is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at American University 
Washington College of Law. 
InTroducTIon


































This	 article	 examines	China’s	 unique	 situation	within	 the	












whose	participation	 in	 the	climate	 regime	 impacts	other	major	










common buT dIFFerenTIaTed responsIbIlITIes
In	 recognition	 of	 the	 daunting	 environmental	 problems	 it	
faces,	China	is	shifting	toward	increased	domestic	environmental	
responsibility,	making	resource	conservation	and	environmental-









and	 developing	 countries	 had	 concerns	 about	 who	 would	 be	
the	first	to	reduce	GHG	emissions,	and	who	would	finance	the	






form	of	elevated	standards	of	 living.20	Thus,	 in	order	 to	reach	
























Based	 upon	 the	 two	 central	 considerations	 of	 CDR,	 the	
























UNFCCC	or	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 that	 elaborate	on	 the	process	
of	categorizing	member	nations.35	This	makes	the	international	
































One	 of	 China’s	 chief	 strategies	 for	 addressing	 global	 cli-
mate	change	is	to	“uphold”	the	principle	of	CDR,	which	currently	
allows	China	 to	avoid	emissions	 reduction	commitments.44	 In	
support	of	its	position,	China	advances	several	arguments,	noting	
the	nation’s	relative	poverty,	its	relatively	low	per	capita	emis-































































the pRinciple of cDR in application iS politically 
ineffective
Notwithstanding	 the	 soundness	 of	 CDR,	 the	 principle	 is	
problematic	 because	 it	 has	 created	 a	 paradigm	 that,	 if	 it	 per-
sists,	will	not	allow	the	nations	of	the	world	to	effectively	com-
bat	global	warming.64	The	current	interpretation	of	CDR	in	the	











For	 example,	 the	 regime	 does	 not	 sufficiently	 distinguish	
between	developing	countries	like	China	and	Botswana.67	The	
closest	 it	 comes	 to	distinguishing	between	developing	country	
parties	 is	 to	 emphasize	 the	 need	 to	 help	 developing	 countries	
that	are	“particularly	vulnerable”	to	the	adverse	impacts	of	cli-
mate	change.68	Accordingly,	China	frames	its	policy	statements	
on	climate	change	 to	fit	 this	 characterization;	 indeed,	 a	 recent	
government	White	Paper	echoes	the	UNFCCC’s	provision	dis-















the pRinciple of cDR in application iS pRactically 
ineffective
Any	climate	change	agreement	that	excludes	China	and	other	
















developing	countries	 to	avoid	reduction	targets	will	 result	 in	a	
considerable	amount	of	GHG	emissions	left	unregulated.78



















no caTegory currenTly exIsTs To properly 


















































The unFccc needs a neW caTegory oF 
emITTer To ensure greaTer parTIcIpaTIon
Although	member	countries	must	agree	to	be	bound	by	the	












ments	upon	parties	and	sufficient	 incentives	 to	draw	parties	 to	
voluntarily	commit,	the	UNFCCC	has	very	few	legal	tools	at	its	
disposal	to	obtain	increased	commitments	out	of	unwilling	parties.
the inteRnational community muSt uSe a vaRiety 












ciently	 solve	an	 international	problem	 that	domestically	poses	









in	public	health	while	also	contributing	 to	 the	global	 effort	 to	
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fight	climate	change.107	Second,	greater	participation	in	the	post-
Kyoto	 regime	 would	 provide	 a	 corresponding	 opportunity	 for	








reputation	as	 an	 international	 leader	 and	 indicate	 to	 the	world	
that	China	envisions	a	leadership	role	that	involves	greater	global	
responsibility.110




























successor	 to	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 so	 long	as	 it	 can	expect	both	
global	and	domestic	net	benefits.119





















































legal founDationS foR ngo paRticipation in 
climate tReaty negotiationS
by Winfield J. Wilson*





in	 multilateral	 environmental	 agreements	 (“MEAs”),4	 and	 is	






























ments.12	 Based	 on	 the	 Lucca	 and	 Almaty	 Decisions,	 NGOs	
could	petition	for	a	compliance	action	against	Denmark	for	the	
administrative	actions	that	led	to	the	exclusion	of	observers	at	
the	 conference	 center	 in	 Copenhagen.	 Ultimately,	 however,	
compliance	rests	with	the	Parties	when	they	decide	whether	to	
take	action	at	Meetings	of	the	Parties,	although	they	do	take	into	




































Climate	Treaty	Negotiations	continued on page 69
* Winfield J. Wilson is a J.D./M.P.P. candidate, May 2011, at American Univer-
sity Washington College of Law & School of Public Affairs.
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book Review
*Lauren Trevisan is a J.D. Candidate, May 2012, at American University 
Washington College of Law.
book Review: StoRmS of my gRanDchilDRen: 
the tRuth about the coming climate 
cataStRophe anD ouR laSt chance to Save 
humanity
by James Hansen
Reviewed by Lauren Trevisan*


















Vice	 President’s	 Climate	 Task	 Force.	 Hansen	 was	 optimis-
tic	going	into	the	meeting,	taking	his	invitation	as	a	sign	that	
the	 Bush	 administration	 planned	 to	 make	 good	 on	 its	 cam-
paign	promises	to	reduce	carbon	dioxide.	However,	this	meet-

































straightforward	and	 logical,	Hansen’s	 reasoning	proved	 to	be	
highly	controversial.
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